11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington to the July 7, 2005 subway

bombings in London to the November 2008 assault on Mumbaihave had

direct connections to individuals and groups operating in Pakistan. Islamist

militants based there also regularly launch attacks on government and coalition

targets in Afghanistan. Such violence inflicts significant human and economic

costs on the international community, threatens to incite a regional

conflagration with India, and undermines international efforts to stabilize

Southwest Asia.

Debates on the source of such violence revolve around two theories. One is

that terrorism is a central element of Pakistan’s strategy to combat India’s

Proponents of this view believe that Islamabad has not prevented terrorism

emanating from its soil largely because it does not wish to; Pakistan finds

terrorist violence far too useful a tool to combat it seriously. Regional expert

Frederic Grare, a supporter of this theory, argues that Pakistan continues ‘‘to

nurture terrorist groups as a means of securing its geopolitical goals’’ because

DOI: 10.1080/01636600903418686

Sumit Ganguly is a professor of political science and the director of research of the Center on

American and Global Security at Indiana University, Bloomington. He wishes to thank the

Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University for generous

institutional support during the writing of this article. He can be reached at

sganguly@indiana.edu. S. Paul Kapur is an associate professor in the department of national

security affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and a faculty affiliate at Stanford

University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He thanks Jude Shell for

valuable research assistance. He can be reached at spkapur@nps.edu. The views the authors

express in this article are their own.

The second theory is based on the idea that most terrorism results from local

use Pakistani territory or maintain ties to people or organizations within

Pakistan, but they do so despite official efforts to prevent it, not as tools of the

government of Pakistan. For example, in the wake of the London subway

Pakistan was blamed for terrorist violence overseas. He maintained that the

indoctrination of the London bombers did not occur in Pakistan. Instead, their

Although both theories contain some elements of truth, they are actually

actors as a strategy of asymmetric warfare against stronger adversaries such as

India and the Soviet Union. Islamist militants were armed and trained by

elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services, and funded by a

sophisticated international financial network. This enabled Pakistan to attrite

Indian and Soviet resources via proxy, without having to face either country in a

direct conflict.

own. Along with the government, the army,

and the intelligence services, such groups

now comprise one of the main centers of

gravity within Pakistan. As a result, the

militants are in a position to pursue their

they often act against the interests of their

creators, attacking security personnel, assassinating

government officials, seizing large

swaths of territory within Pakistan, and launching attacks on India that could

Although Pakistan is largely to blame for creating and nurturing the jihadis, it is

no longer wholly in control of them, and they should not be seen simply as tools

Neither India nor Pakistan has reacted to these developments constructively.

Pakistan has largely remained in a state of denial, refusing to take responsibility

for its role in causing the jihadi problem. It has occasionally moved against

the militants, but has never truly attempted to shut them down. Nor has it made

blame for creating

the jihadis, but it is no

longer wholly in

control of them.

Sumit Ganguly & S. Paul Kapur

serious efforts to deliver services and create social conditions that could make

militancy less attractive, preferring instead to invest resources in pursuing its

ongoing conflict with India. India, for its part, is working to coerce Pakistan into

over jihadi organizations. Furthermore, many of the coercive tools that it is

acquiring, such as enhanced conventional military capabilities, are inappropriate

to the task. Indeed, they may encourage further support from Pakistan for

militancy by making the country less secure. Thus, neither India nor Pakistan

has been able to play the role of regional sorcerer and rein in the jihadis.

significant degree, inflicting considerable costs on stronger adversaries without

militants has increasingly spun out of control, creating serious internal and

external security challenges. Can India and Pakistan transcend their traditional

apprentice problem?

Pakistan’s Long Dalliance with Militancy

been using proxy forces since attaining independence from the United Kingdom.

In October 1947, Pakistan employed Pathan tribesmen to attack the princely

state of Kashmir as its monarch vacillated on the question of whether to accede

to India or to Pakistan. The rebels quickly advanced on the Kashmiri capital of

As attacking forces approached Srinagar, a panicked Maharaja Hari Singh

appealed to New Delhi for military assistance. The government of India agreed

to defend Kashmir if Singh would commit to join the territory to India. He

complied, signing an Instrument of Accession on October 28, 1947. Shortly

regular forces against the Indian military. The conflict ended in stalemate on

and Pakistan the remaining third. This division of territory largely set the

Pakistan resorted to irregular forces again in August 1965 by employing

militants infiltrated Indian Kashmir to precipitate an uprising, which was to be

followed by a Pakistani conventional military operation to seize the territory.

The plan presumed widespread Kashmiri support for Pakistan and disaffection

with India. This assumption proved to be wrong; locals promptly alerted the

authorities to the presence of the infiltrators, enabling Indian forces to move

the first war, this conflict ended essentially in stalemate. The two parties

Tashkent Agreement of 1966.

Kashmir. Indeed, almost immediately after the 1965 war, elements within the

Pakistani military started to recruit religious zealots in the Kashmir Valley in

hopes of sowing discord and promoting political upheaval within the state. To

that end, the Pakistanis started to work with a newly created organization called

the Plebiscite Front. While some elements of the Front were willing to limit

themselves to the realm of political struggle, others wanted to resort to violence

These efforts suffered an important setback

in the early 1970s, as India cracked down

invasion of Afghanistan, Islamabad renewed

presided over the mujahideen campaign in

Afghanistan, which played an indispensible

role in defeating the Soviet Union. His death

during the summer of 1988 in a plane crash

prevented him from applying this strategy to

Kashmir. When an indigenous uprising erupted in Indian Kashmir in December

1989, however, his successors lost little time in doing so. The Pakistanis initially

backed the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a homegrown,

notionally secular separatist organization, but such support proved to be shortlived.

The JKLF did not wish to join Kashmir to Pakistan. Instead, it sought the

creation of an independent Kashmir encompassing both Indian and Pakistanicontrolled

portions of the state.

(ISI) marginalized the JKLF, redirecting their resources toward more Islamistoriented

organizations dedicated to establishing Pakistani control over Indiaadministered

Kashmir. These organizations ranged from the predominantly

and the jihadis are, to

a significant extent,

now working at cross

purposes.

Sumit Ganguly & S. Paul Kapur

separate Kashmir from India and join it with

Pakistan. Pakistani support for these groups

fundamentally transformed the character of

the Kashmir insurgency, metamorphosizing it

from an indigenous independence struggle,

triggered by the malfeasances of Indian rule,

to an externally orchestrated effort to attrite

Indian resources and seize Jammu and

Indian Parliament while it was in session. Although the terrorists were defeated

and no members were harmed, the assault could have resulted in a massacre of

pressure, Pakistan undertook cosmetic efforts against organizations such as the

LeT and the JeM, briefly incarcerating members of their rank and file. Also, on

January 12, 2002, in a nationally televised speech, Musharraf stated that he would

not allow Pakistani soil to be used as a launching pad for terror against India or

any other country, though he did not rule out the possibility that militant

terrorism, little changed in practice. Soon thereafter, in May 2002, the LeT

were implicated in an attack on the families of soldiers stationed at an Indian

military base at Kaluchak in Jammu and Kashmir.

The December 2001 parliament assault had led India to undertake a massive

military mobilization to coerce Pakistan into ending its support for terrorism.

The May 2002 Kaluchak attack brought the two states to the brink of war.

For reasons that are the subject of a vigorous debate, they managed to avoid

relations remained fraught as Pakistan failed to completely rein in the jihadi

organizations operating on its soil.

centers across India from Bangalore to New Delhi. Indian authorities attributed

several of the attacks to the LeT. Pakistani authorities in some cases ignored the

charges, and in others denied any connection with the bombings. Doubts about

effectively dispelled with the November 2008 assault on Mumbai. A group of 10

terrorists launched a series of carefully planned attacks against the Taj Mahal and

role of South Asian

sorcerer and rein in the

jihadis?

center. Well over one hundred civilians, several security personnel and all but

Pakistani authorities initially denied any link between the Mumbai attackers

and Pakistan. Overwhelming evidence that the terrorists were members of LeT

and that their operation had been planned in, launched from, and directed in real

time by operatives in Pakistan, however, pointed toward the contrary. No longer

Dawa, under house arrest in Lahore. Before long though, Saeed was free once

again after a Pakistani court released the LeTchief in June 2009, citing a paucity of

evidence against him. The provincial government of the Punjab subsequently

withdrew terror charges against Saeed for a similar want of evidence.

shortsighted. Islamabad has adhered to essentially the same strategy in pursuit of

conflict in the region. Despite its repeated efforts, Pakistan has rarely succeeded

in attaining its goals. The 1947 and 1965 Kashmir wars ended in stalemate. The

the Indians to leave the territory. To the contrary, the Indians have become more

behavior has created serious regional tensions that could trigger a major conflict,

and diverted resources away from other urgent domestic priorities such as

economic development, educational reforms, and infrastructure renewal. Thus,

warfare strategy has in fact achieved notable successes. Its support of mujahideen

Pakistanis have inflicted serious economic, military, and diplomatic costs on

India. They have also led New Delhi to adopt draconian antiterrorism policies

that have badly tarnished its international image. In neither case was Pakistan

forced to engage in direct combat against a stronger adversary. Rather, the use of

while avoiding direct conflict and the concomitant risk of catastrophic defeat.

should not be dismissed as an abject failure.

faces the serious problem that those militant organizations, which the Pakistanis

Sumit Ganguly & S. Paul Kapur

created and nurtured to execute their policy, no longer wholly share their aims or

Many seek not just to liberate Kashmir or to join it to Pakistan but see eventual

control of territory within India proper as the true prize in their struggle. And they

will not allow the Pakistani state to prevent them from attaining it. Nasr Javed, a

LeTofficial, delivering a speech at the Quba Mosque in Islamabad on February 5,

will continue to wage jihad and propagate it till eternity. No government can

The jihadi organizations also oppose

Pakistani efforts to cooperate with U.S.

antiterrorism efforts. In the wake of the 9/

11 attacks, the U.S. government realized

that Islamist terrorism was not an issue

isolated to the Middle East or South Asia.

Rather, it was a global problem that directly

U.S. leaders also decided that they needed

Pakistan to serve as a leading partner in

policy. It would no longer ignore Pakistani support for militancy in South Asia,

and it would offer Pakistan substantial military and economic benefits for

cooperating in its antiterror efforts. In order to reap these rewards, Pakistan

agreed to serve as an ally in the U.S. antiterrorism campaign. As a result, the

Pakistanis were forced to limit support for Islamist insurgents in Kashmir,

occasionally even outlawing militant groups. This Pakistani cooperation with

the United States alienated the militant organizations. These groups, which

owed their existence to Islamabad, branded Musharraf a traitor and turned

against the Pakistani government.

Meanwhile, the Taliban, whose control of Afghanistan had been strongly

supported by the Pakistani government, now seeks not just to retake Afghanistan,

main Taliban group in Pakistan, have asserted control over swaths of territory to

resist the central government, enforce a strict interpretation of Sharia law, and

unite with the Afghan Taliban against NATO forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan

would benefit from Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan: it would mean a friendly

government in Kabul, afford Pakistan badly needed strategic depth, allow it more

Indian approach runs a

serious risk of

influence. Islamabad, however, does not wish to cede control of its own territory to

Taliban elements.

These differences between the goals of the Pakistani state and the Islamist groups

it helped to create and nurture have severely undermined Pakistani security in a

number of ways. First, they have led to outright violence between the militants and

Pakistani forces (for example, the Pakistan army has been battlingTaliban elements

in SouthWaziristan). Such conflict is costly, both in military terms and in terms of

put Pakistani leaders at risk. Musharraf survived multiple assassination attempts

after siding with the United States in the war on terror. And militants associated

with the Pakistani Taliban succeeded in killing former prime minister Benazir

Bhutto as she sought to return to office. Third, jihadi attacks on Indian targets, such

terrorist incident in India, Pakistan could be held responsible even if Islamabad was

not involved in planning or executing the attackas it evidently was not in the

could find domestic political pressure to do so overwhelming.

Significantly, this is occurring at a time when the Pakistanis can ill afford it.

Islamabad would like to deescalate tensions with New Delhi and reduce the

stabilizing its internal security situation in the northwest. Instead, the danger of

conflict with India forces Pakistan to divide its attention between the northwest

and the East, making its task of internal stabilization significantly more difficult.

Thus, the Pakistani state and the jihadis whom it no longer fully controls are, to

a significant extent, working at cross purposes.

Following the November 2008 attacks on Mumbai, a single question echoed

from New Delhi to Washington: were the Mumbai attacks simply the work of

inability to reassert control over them, this was the wrong question to ask. The

relevant question is: who will now play the role of South Asian sorcerer and rein

in the jihadis?

either Pakistan or India. Recent events, such as the Mumbai attacks, have shown

that neither is presently up to the challenge. The government of Pakistan has

Sumit Ganguly & S. Paul Kapur

terrorism, but the Mumbai attacks demonstrate that Islamabad is unable to

honor this pledge. India, for its part, cannot defend itself against such attacks.

Despite the fact that the Indian authorities had received credible warnings of a

seaborne terrorist operation, a mere handful of terrorists were able to keep Indian

security personnel at bay for nearly three days, showing that the Indian

authorities were caught completely off guard.

India does enjoy conventional military superiority over Pakistan. This

advantage does not, however, afford the Indians many good options for

dealing with the jihadis. The Indians could strike across the Line of Control

plausible option. But even if such attacks were successful, they would yield only

limited benefits because Kashmiri militant camps are transitory and lack

infrastructure.

Because strikes on militant camps are not

likely to be profitable, the Indians could

into Pakistan proper in the event of further

terrorism. Although India would eventually

prevail in such a conflict, victory would be

confrontation might make continued tolerance

expensive for Pakistan, thus finally convincing Pakistan to fully

renounce the jihadi option. But even if Indian leaders decided that the

capacity makes it infeasible. Given the danger of triggering a nuclear response, it

conflict with Pakistan, despite Pakistani nuclear weapons (for example, the 1999

A series of rapid, more limited attacks into Pakistani territory could inflict

significant costs on Pakistan without triggering a nuclear exchange. The

possibility of such action might stand a better chance of convincing Pakistan

conventional war. India is acquiring increasingly sophisticated conventional

coercive capabilities could prove irrelevant. Pakistan may be unable to control

take decisive action

against militants soon, it

may lose control of the

state.

convince Pakistan that it must rein in the jihadis, and still fail to prevent further

terrorism. The jihadi networks in Pakistan are so pervasive and their strength so

military and intelligence services to sever all links, albeit not without costs,

cannot be slayed. In addition, a more coercive Indian approach runs a serious risk

could render Pakistan even less secure and increase its incentives to promote

militancy even further.

problem. Unfortunately, their nuclear arsenals are largely useless as well. Nuclear

conventional retaliation while militants launched attacks in Indian Kashmir.

Nuclear weapons cannot now be used to eradicate the terrorists who flourished

under this strategy and today wreak havoc in both India and Pakistan. And nuclear

prevent New Delhi from taking action that, though costly, could potentially

tightly controls the nuclear arsenal. The army has enormous incentives to ensure

Still, Pakistan could face situations in which its arsenal might be vulnerable. For

example, if Pakistan attempted to move weapons during a crisis with India,

militants could capture them as they are being transported, particularly if the

Of course, even if they managed to steal a weapon, the militants would still face

a number of difficult tasks, such as determining how to use it. Nonetheless, the

therefore, are not only unable to help India or Pakistan play the role of a South

Asian sorcerer, they could even potentially pose dangers of their own.

Taming the Apprentice

Sumit Ganguly & S. Paul Kapur

India and Pakistan adopting policies that transcend their traditional comfort zones.

Pakistan must truly forswear militancy, ending support for the jihadis and accepting

international military and financial assistance in crushing them. The Pakistanis

need to recognize that, despite past successes, the costs of supporting militancy now

outweigh its benefits. Recent events, such as the Mumbai attacks, may present

Islamabad with a final opportunity to get control of the situation. If the

government of Pakistan does not take decisive action against the militants soon,

it may lose control of the state or find itself drawn into a catastrophic conflict with

India in the wake of another terrorist attack.

Pakistan has moved against terrorist organizations in the past. These measures,

however, have been mostly cosmetic and of short duration. Following government

crackdowns, terrorist groups have traditionally changed their names and quickly

resumed their activities. Even in the wake of

officials initially denied any connection between

the Mumbai terrorists and Pakistan, arresting

Saeed only when faced with overwhelming

releasing him soon thereafter. Given this track

record, it is doubtful that Pakistan will move

seriously against Islamist militancy in the near

future. Only time will tell for certain.

The Indians, for their part, must take their own security far more seriously. In

1991, following a major financial crisis, the Indian government acknowledged its

for economic growth. Similarly, India must use the Mumbai attacks to wholly

revamp its security infrastructure. They appear to have begun to do so. In the

wake of the attacks, the government announced that it was enhancing its

maritime security capabilities, creating a U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigationlike

National Investigative Agency, increasing intelligence sharing, improving

the training and equipment of police and domestic security forces, and

strengthening antiterrorism laws. The Indians must follow through on these

initiatives.

concerns, both in Kashmir and in India proper. This will reduce the incentives

for continued Kashmiri insurgency, and lower the likelihood that overseas

terrorists will find willing accomplices within India. If they fail to implement

will be for naught. Skyrocketing gross domestic product, sophisticated

conventional military capabilities, and even nuclear weapons mean little

require a radical

rethinking of the

framework.

when ordinary citizens are not safe in railway stations, streets, hospitals, and

attacks, international corporations will lose interest in the country, refusing to do

business in what they view as an excessively dangerous environment.

None of the steps outlined above will provide an overnight solution to the

problems of Islamist militancy within South Asia. These can, however, help

fails to meet this challenge, its most pressing security problem will go

unaddressed and the implications will reverberate far beyond South Asia.

Notes

pakistan_final.pdf.

2. ‘‘Pak Not Behind Terror in Other Nations: Pervez,’’ Press Trust of India, August 4,

Had No Role in London Bombings,’’ Press Trust of India, August 9, 2005, http://

in.rediff.com/news/2005/aug/09ukblast1.htm.

5. For details of the Pakistani strategy see Sumit Ganguly, ‘‘Deterrence Failure Revisited:

Cambridge University Press, 1997).

10. See Vikas Bajaj and Lydia Polgren, ‘‘Suspect Stirs Mumbai Court By Confessing,’’

html.

12. See Timothy D. Hoyt, ‘‘Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic

(February 18, 2008), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/6_32.htm.

Sumit Ganguly & S. Paul Kapur

www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/world/asia/27pstan.html.