policy had two key enduring components. First, Tehran sought to deal with Iran’s

new security dilemma brought about by the U.S. presence in both Iraq and

Afghanistan after 2003. Iran responded with an ‘‘accommodating policy,’’ which

consisted of expanding cooperation after Saddam’s fall with the main Arab world

actors, principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and seeking direct talks with the

United States. This included Iran’s engagement in direct talks with Coalition

Forces regarding the prevailing security situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

In this way, Iran hoped to avoid both a new round of rivalry with its Arab

neighbors and a new security dilemma in its relations with the United States.

The second component was to seek an ‘‘alliance policy’’ while regionalizing

the nuclear issue, in which Iran sought to tie and interweave the nuclear issue

with broader regional dynamics such as Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal and

Syria) and political movements (e.g., Hezbollah or Shi‘ite factions in Iraq),

Iran tried to deter the U.S. or Israeli military threat in the short term and to

prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. role in its backyard in the long term.

The prevailing view in the United States is that Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy

and Iran’s increasing presence in the region has been offensive, expansionist,

opportunistic, and often ideological. Though Iran has occasionally taken

advantage of new opportunities, these characterizations have been exaggerated

in the United States. Instead, Iran’s action should be perceived in a more

DOI: 10.1080/01636600903430665

Kayhan Barzegar is an assistant professor of international relations at Science and Research

Campus, Islamic Azad University, a senior research fellow at the Center for Middle East

Strategic Studies in Tehran, and a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and

International Affairs at Harvard University. He can be reached at kayhan_barzegar

@hks.harvard.edu. The author would like to thank Eskandar Sadeghi, doctoral candidate at

St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, for his suggestions and comments.

pragmatic light. Though Ahmadinejad may

himself be an ideological and divisive figure,

ought to be viewed as a wider Iranian effort to

secure its geostrategic interests and national

tendencies to indulge his eccentricities, the

process always ensures this return to

pragmatism.

inseparable from settling the ongoing nuclear dispute and reaching a broader

administration from pursuing engagement and cooperation. President Barack

Obama must not make the same mistake. He should reexamine the current

policy.

policymakers have speculated about divisions among the Iranian political elite,

outstanding regional disputes. Such a policy, however, will bear little fruit.

Though there are of course differences of style and approach among the elite, it

the face of foreign threats of increased sanctions and military attack. What,

second term in office?

Iran’s New Security Challenges

Iraq and Afghanistan. There is, however, a historical legacy at play as well with

their concomitant historical traumas. Iranians have been wary and sensitive to

the presence of foreign armies along their immediate borders and incursions into

Iran proper since the Qajar dynasty suffered two humiliating defeats at the hand

of the Tsarist armies in the nineteenth century. History repeated itself in World

security dilemma

brought about by the

U.S. presence in Iraq

and Afghanistan.

Kayhan Barzegar

Central Intelligence Agency orchestrated coup, which ousted the democratically

elected government of nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, and

most recently, in the era of the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. backing of the

estimated to have cost as many as one million casualties.

To return to the present day, with the arrival of the Obama administration,

there has been much talk of a substantive change in the U.S. approach to Iran.

regional balance of power remains largely unchanged. For over half a century,

U.S. policy in the Middle East, and especially in the Persian Gulf, has been to

maintain a balance of power while preventing regional supremacy. As a result, the

Turkey and Egypt, as well as his conciliatory pronouncements toward the broader

Islamic world, were all seen as efforts to shore up regional support against Iran

and weaken its ability to withstand international pressure. It is this belief

New Year greeting by stressing that a change in Iranian attitudes would be

Although the geopolitical changes following the Iraq and Afghanistan crises

simultaneously presented unprecedented challenges such as ethnic geopolitical

rivalries, Sunni extremism, religious and civil war, the probability of territorial

disintegration, and the spread of insecurity and instability more generally across

the region. Furthermore, the ongoing tensions surrounding the issue of Iraqi

federalism remain a matter of great national security concern for Iran. An Iraq

consisting of smaller and weaker parts would provide a basis for the increased

Challenges to political sensitivities and rivalries among regional countries have

germane than ever to Lebanese domestic issues. Based on the theory of making

inextricable.

policies over the last eight years. The Bush administration tried to diminish

transform Iraq into a potential model for Iran in the hope of forging a new

with a minimum role for Iran in its own immediate security circle.

As a result, Iran and the United States saw each other as strategic adversaries,

each trying to gain the upper hand over one

another. Actions that Washington considered

Tehran as sowing the seeds of insecurity and

Obama administration will not continue the

same policies, no concrete measures have yet

been taken. Consequently, Iran continues to

call for U.S. troop withdrawal, and was

Political Security Agreement, which installed

U.S. troops for many years, subsequently

planned Iraq troop withdrawal for August 2010, however, has elicited a positive

response from Tehran.

diplomatic style and greater appreciation of regional subtleties, it is still too early

however, that this will induce a fundamental change in Iranian behavior will

prove to be misguided. Ahmadinejad will continue to pursue a foreign policy that

emphasis on diplomacy. Even an improved security situation in Iraq and

Afghanistan should not disguise the fact that, when and if necessary, Iran can

against the nuclear

program have

the capability to

unite Iran’s political

elite.

Kayhan Barzegar

assert its influence in ways that could be highly problematic for coalition forces in

2001 attacks in its initial invasion of Afghanistan and ousting of the Taliban,

incumbent Iranian president, but proved to the more skeptical factions that

cooperation with the United States would do little to ameliorate the

that the United States is an essential part of any equation which would assure

The Iranian leadership has reiterated time and again that a genuine change of

policy by the Obama administration is necessary. This would involve changing

the traditional policy of balance of power, which is itself a source of tension and

the result of an arms race that had begun due to a similar policy. This policy has

proven neither efficient nor acceptable to Iran. The region can not be secured at

the United States that a powerful Iran will endanger U.S. regional interests.

of opportunities opening up as a result of the regional vacuum created by the

continue to hold sway and dictate the behavior of the incumbent Iranian

are ideological or pragmatic has different policy implications for the United

States. Given the cultural, political, and security characteristics of its manifold

From an Iranian perspective, any tendency to empower federalism in Iraq would

especially those stemming from the current U.S. presence. Rather than a longterm

factions, such as the al Sadr faction, are primarily tactical and short term.

And these primarily exist with an eye to undermine the unilateral U.S. policy of

Iran has always stated its support for the

Nouri al Maliki government and the

moderate factions (e.g., al Daawa and

policy to improve strategic relations with

30, 2008 between the al Maliki government

fact overtly supported the Iraqi government forces against the Mahdi Army and

Sadr neighborhood militia, who in the past have harbored and issued hostile

view in the United States and the Arab world, which often interpreted the

rounds of rivalry with its Arab neighbors and simultaneously seek to prevent the

creation of a new security dilemma in its relations with the United States.

Iran, therefore, has applied both pragmatic and ideological instruments in

regulating its policy toward Iraq. On one hand, through its support of friendly

On the other hand, by stressing the unity of Iraq, Iran has tried to foil the

to think of direct

Kayhan Barzegar

national security. In this regard, even the factor of ideology, a dynamic element

Iran knows that the United States has vital interests in Iraq, as well as the region

at large, and is not likely to leave the region completely. Iran also knows that the

help the United States secure its interests without an excessive regional

presence. The strategic value of this deal is to establish a new kind of balance

of interests and balance of security between Iran and the United States. In this

Likewise, advancing cooperation with the United States and other relevant

inclinations. The strong willingness to proceed with direct talks with the United

the United States in Iraq. Tehran simply seeks to minimize the threat posed by the

U.S. presence in the region through cooperation and engagement. In this manner,

not to engage directly in any conflict with the United States in Iraq and the

as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Iran has pursued a strategy of maintaining amicable

relationships mostly through reassurance and cooperation. For instance, Iran has

attempted to advance regional cooperation by actively participating in regional

increased regional involvement as imperative, notwithstanding the numerous

defensive policy assumptions:

An Insecure and Unstable Neighborhood

Living in an unstable neighborhood has been costly for Iran over the past

decades. The continued instability and sectarian conflict across the western

border (Iraq), failed and unstable states in the east (Afghanistan and Pakistan),

transforming states in the north (Central Asia and the Caucasus), and

authoritarian and security dependant regimes in the south and Persian Gulf,

potential to spread regional rivalries, military conflict, crises, and subsequently

stamina is being spent on tackling these varied threats in the region. The need to

for instance, justified the perpetuation of a great Iranian army to tackle future

Interconnected Security

or defense through active military

security has been seen as synonymous

paying a great price for preserving regional

security, without receiving appropriate

significant to the United States and

regional states, there needs to be an

security system. Iran will not continue to ensure that the region is secure at the

By pursuing this policy, Tehran also aims to warn other states in the region of

the cost of helping the United States in any possible future military operations

against Iran, making it clear that such actions would result in greater insecurity

era is very much dependent on the United States coming to terms with the very

real cost incurred by Iran in ensuring regional stability, such as the costs of

stability, especially in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf in the coming

rhetoric as long as the Obama administration seeks to circumvent Iran by

cultivating regional rivalries in order to pressure Iran to cede ground on the

nuclear and other outstanding regional issues.

the region has more

often bred Western

complacency and

arrogance.

Kayhan Barzegar

Preempting Future Security Threats

intimately tie its national security to that of the region as a whole. To preempt

political and economic architecture and activities. With the acquisition of a

greater role, effective responsibility, and assurances that it can preempt future

threats, Iran will be able to use its political and military energy for the sake of

economic and political development. Viewed in this context, establishing

neighboring states will lead the region toward greater stability and mutual

challenges. By supporting those political factions or groups in Iraq that are, in

a remarkable break with the past, friendlier today toward Iran and unwilling to

attempted to coax Baghdad into fulfilling the role of a strategic partner in the

region.

Accommodating and Alliance Foreign Policy

always featured prominently in the conduct of Iranian foreign policy, since each

dimension has deep roots in the geostrategic position and ideology of Iran. What

has differed from administration to administration is the priority given to these

respective elements.

Iraq War, Tehran prioritized an accommodating foreign policy toward states like

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This policy was continued by the Khatami

and Hezbollah but tended to lean toward mending relations in the region, which

had been severely strained immediately after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Ahmadinejad, however, reversed the priorities of Iranian foreign policy. While

he still sought to maintain cordial relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, he

factions such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Unlike his predecessors, therefore,

its nuclear program.

Thus, by becoming especially vociferous on the Palestinian issue and the

Israeli military assault on Lebanon in the summer of 2006, Ahmadinejad

endeavored to carve out a role for Iran on a broader regional scale. Such

conflicts, which he sees as having roots in longstanding historical issues of

contention and injustices, are inseparable in his mind from Western efforts to

retard Iranian development by depriving it of a raft of modern technologies, most

prominently civilian nuclear technology. He also believes that by speaking out

able to garner and engender support among the masses of a slew of Muslim

majority states.

An accommodating foreign policy, however, focuses on the geopolitical

affairs of its immediate neighbors such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian

Gulf. From this perspective, too much engagement with the Arab world, which

and wealth.

Experience has shown that the more Iran

feels threatened, the more likely it is to

expand its regional presence. Though in the

will promote its deterrent power to engage

potential security threats, in the long term it

will bring unnecessary tension and strategic

key players such as Saudi Arabia and the United States. Viewed from this

perspective, Iran should align itself with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, maintain

strategic relations with Syria, continue its support of Hezbollah as a friendly

Syria is aimed more at either balancing the Israeli military threat or deterrent

power to counter the perceived threats currently stemming from the U.S.

and ideological ties fostering political and moral solidarity, which inevitably play

a vital role in the battle for hearts and minds.

accepted the role of

the United States in

Iraq.

Kayhan Barzegar

Meanwhile, Iran should take advantage of all the influence its foreign policy

marginalized position into an active regional player. Its growing potentiality

advantage of its natural attributes to counterbalance any negatives in its

relations with its Arab neighbors. For example, by establishing a coalition with

traditional political rival, as well as a conventional military threat, into a

political and military stamina but provides Iran with a unique status in the Arabdominated

region.

By drawing a broader circle of security, therefore, Iran has linked its security

with regional dynamics, enhancing its role to tackle the current threats

emanating from its immediate security environment. This has been key to

will be continued in his second. The essential point to note is the linking of

government and the Iranian political elite have sought to package together

concerns in order to afford Iran greater strategic value and bargaining power in

any future negotiations.

The Comprehensive Package Deal

nor will it lead to a lasting settlement. The single most effective route is to

accept the aforesaid mutual areas of concern as a comprehensive package, which

would afford Iran strategic parity in the course of negotiations. Only then will

Iran feel confident enough to make genuine concessions and acquire the

defensive and based on an interconnected security and concomitant domino

disputes.

The Iranian leadership knows very well

that only the nuclear issue has the power to

bring the United States to the negotiating

table and provide impetus for a settlement of

concern (e.g., Iranian support for Hezbollah,

Hamas, and Islamic Jihad). The nuclear

program serves as a point of convergence in

thereby has the unrivalled potential to act as

a catalyst to reconcile any outstanding issues and grievances. Unlike other issues of

foreign policy over which there may be disagreement or vigorous debate, when it

have domestic grassroots support, and the continued potential to act as a source of

legitimacy for the Ahmadinejad government in the face of foreign criticism. Today,

the nuclear programis perceived as amatter of technological advancement, national

pride, and solidarity that bolsters Iranian identity and status regionally and

internationally. Consequently, all political parties in Iran demand the pursuit of a

tough stance in talks on the nuclear program. The nuclear program, therefore, is

and that is the line of national interest.

Among elite support, the program has the backing of supreme leader

along with the supreme leader, have representatives at the National Security

policy. Despite differences that exist among all bodies and representatives, the

council ensures a consensus among them. Hence, Western efforts to try to

Ahmadinejad will continue to pursue his proactive foreign policy to counter

Western pressure, if Washington refuses to take genuine steps toward a

substantive change in policy. The United States needs to formulate a longterm

a miscalculated and erroneous understanding of the significance and future of

Iranian politics after its presidential election.

At present, the main controversy between Iran and the United States is who

should take the first step, and what should that step should be. While the Bush

administration spoke of preconditions and demanded suspending uranium

enrichment, the Obama administration has spoken of negotiations without

issue has the power

to bring the United

States to the

negotiating table.

Kayhan Barzegar

preconditions but arguably has fallen into old patterns by setting vague and

unilateral deadlines in late September 2009. Diplomacy is undoubtedly a

facility (which is still under construction) to International Atomic Energy

Agency inspectors. Very quickly in the course of the October 2009 Geneva talks,

Tehran has further agreed to send its declared enriched uranium to Russia for

measured, the belief that Washington can exploit apparent divisions within

in the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings on Iran in July 2009, which

Such a strategy, however, will fail for several reasons. First, Ahmadinejad has

the confidence and support of Khamenei, who has final authorization over

policy. In fact, it would have been nearly impossible for a strong reformist

entrenched institutional obstacles to such action would have made such a feat

nearly impossible. Ahmadinejad, however, is eager to forge ahead along the path

administration will continue along the diplomatic trajectory outlined by

Obama in the U.S. presidential campaign and following his inauguration, or

whether the administration will return to delusions of regime change in the

hopes of destabilizing Iran and extracting gains from the Iranian leadership,

which will prove unacceptable to all across the Iranian political spectrum.

Furthermore, regional issues cannot be isolated from the broader picture. By

initiating an active foreign policy and engaging decisively in places such as

Afghanistan, Gaza, Iraq, and Lebanon, Iran has been comparable to the United

game. Regional activeness has offered Iran the opportunity to redefine its role in

the desire to hold direct talks is present on both the U.S. and Iranian sides. In

in important global and strategic issues, has made engagement inevitable. In

military threats, has intensified internal desires to start direct talks.

If Obama, however, falls into the trap of resorting to the threats and dogmatic

policies adopted by his predecessors, a historic opportunity could well be missed.

Iraq and Afghanistan are far from

stabilized and Iran could prove vital to

bring lasting security to the region.

Ahmadinejad, however, will not concede

He has staked far too much of his

credibility on the matter. In any case, the

nuclear portfolio has never been under

his undisputed control. The important

question, as far as the United States is concerned, is whether the Obama

administration is willing to take the courageous step of engaging in meaningful

diplomacy, while resisting the temptation to bow to internal and external

pressures. Continued attempts to isolate and weaken Iran will only be to the

detriment of U.S. goals, which are oriented toward assuring stability,

nonproliferation, and the peaceful resolution of ongoing regional conflicts.

The Endgame: What Happens Now?

Policymakers should, therefore, pay close attention to the three key issues which

There is no doubt that the key to solving the Iranian puzzle and ameliorating

the profound distrust between Iran and the United States lies in coming to a

realistic and lasting resolution of the nuclear crisis. It is crucial because it will

continued presence of the independent nuclear fuel cycle on Iranian territory is

in exchange for an international monitoring consortium with U.S. participation

and nonproliferation, might be the only feasible option.

The settlement of the Iranian nuclear crisis should not be seen as separate

from the various regional crises, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and the ongoing

allow Iran to work in coordination with the United States, as opposed to playing

should not be seen as

separate from the

various regional

crises.

Kayhan Barzegar

the roles of strategic adversaries, to bring greater security to the region. If the

crisis is resolved and the U.S. military presence is wound down to a level at

could move toward coexistence instead of mutual exclusivity.

greater emphasis on obtaining tangible benefits. The crux of the matter is how

the United States will react. If the Obama administration seeks to bring further

pressure to bear on Iran in the form of another round of sanctions at the UN

pleasant new year greetings will prove to be far from enough, if there is any hope

of breaking the deadlock. Obama has to make a choice between going for longterm

stability in a region that is strategically important to the United States and

weeks will tell the tale.

Notes

overtures/.

12643/.

(Fall 2004): 550.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/32055.html.

mediated to settle the crisis. See Hiro, ‘‘Wining Iraq Without Losing to Iran.’’

9. For example, Iran has hosted and participated in most of the regional conferences at the

Tehran, August 2007 in Damascus, November 2007 in Istanbul, and April 2008 in

Kuwait (See ‘‘Kuwait Conference: 20 Regional, Int’l Events but did they Bring Security,

html?Itemid126). Iran also actively participated in the Doha conference held to

bring a ceasefire in Lebanon in May 2008. Iran’s involvement itself, however, is an issue

of concern to Arab countries in the Middle East.

Persian).

cooperation have always been initiated by Iran’s officials. See for instance,

summit, held in December 2007 in Doha, Qatar. See ‘‘Iran Presents 12 Proposals at

PGCC Summit,’’ Payvand’s Iran News, December 4, 2007, http://www.payvand.com/

former secretary of Iran’s National Security Council at the World Economic Forum in

Doha, Qatar in April 2007. See Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, ‘‘Iran unveils a Persian Gulf security

ID14Ak04.html.

13. See Kayhan Barzegar, ‘‘De´

tente in Khatami’s Foreign Policy and its Impact on

15. This defense strategy has repeatedly been asserted by Iran’s high rank official such

as Khamenei, Speaker of Majlis Ali Larijani, Secretary of National Security Council

Saeed Jalili, and head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp [IRGC] Major

General Jaffari. See ‘‘Iran’s LeaderWarns U.S. Against Attack,’’ MSNBC.com, February

8, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17042605/; ‘‘Iran: Middle East Security at Risk,’’

CNN.com, February 8, 2007, www.cnn.com/2007/world/meast/11/22/iran.nuclear/

index.html; ‘‘IRGC Commander Gen. Mohammad Ja’fari: If Attacked, Iran Will Target

2008, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Pagearchives&Areasd&IDSP183308.

17. Steven Erlanger and Mark Landler, ‘‘Iran Agrees to Send Enriched Uranium to Russia,’’

02nuke.html.

Kayhan Barzegar

House Foreign Relations Committee, July 22, 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/